The modern corporation and private property pdf
Modern Corporation and Private Property | The Economic Journal | Oxford AcademicThis monumental work on the corporation is one of those enduring classics that many cite but few have read. Graced with a new introduction by Weidenbaum and Jensen, this new edition makes this classic available to a new generation. Written in the early s, The Modern Corporation and Private Property remains the fundamental introduction to the internal organization of the corporation in modern society. Combining the analytical skills of an attorney with those of an economist, Berle and Means raise the central questions, even when their answers have been superseded by changing circumstances. The book's most enduring theme is the separation of ownership from control of the modern corporation and its consequences. Berle and Means display keen awareness of the divergent interests of directors and managers, and of each from owners of the firm. Among their predictions are the characteristic increase in size of the modem corporation and concentration of the economy.
The Modern Corporation and Private Property Revisited: Gardiner Means and the Administered Price
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Private Property vs. No Private Property: The Results
It explores the evolution of big business through a legal and economic lens, and argues that in the modern world those who legally have ownership over companies have been separated from their control. The second, revised edition was released in It serves as a foundational text in corporate governance , corporate law company law , and institutional economics. Berle and Means argued that the structure of corporate law in the United States in the s enforced the separation of ownership and control because the corporate person formally owns a corporate entity even while shareholders own shares in the corporate entity and elect corporate directors who control the company's activities. This occurred for a number of reasons, foremost being the dispersal of shareholding ownership in big corporations: the typical shareholder is uninterested in the day-to-day affairs of the company, yet thousands of people like him or her make up the majority of owners throughout the economy. The result is that those who are directly interested in day-to-day affairs, the management and the directors , have the ability to manage the resources of companies to their own advantage without effective shareholder scrutiny. Berle and Means researched the consequences of ownership and control being separate.