Intention plans and practical reason pdf

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intention plans and practical reason pdf

Requirements of intention in light of belief | SpringerLink

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Published 27.12.2018


Par olson diane le vendredi, juin 16 , - Lien permanent. What happens to our conception of mind and rational agency when we take seriously future-directed intentions and plans and their roles as inputs into further practical reasoning? The author's initial efforts in responding to this question resulted in a series of papers that he wrote during the early s.

Michael Bratman

Michael E. Bratman graduated from Haverford College in and earned his Ph. He joined the faculty at Stanford University in , where he has taught ever since. Bratman works in philosophy of action and moral philosophy and is best known for his development of the idea that "intention is a distinctive practical attitude marked by its pivotal role in planning for the future. Bratman's theory of intentions as plans has also led to a distinctive and widely discussed account of " collective intentionality. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

The Journal of Speculative Philosophy Asmuth, Christoph. Das Begriefen des Unbegreiflich.
with malice toward none book

The Journal of Speculative Philosophy

Introduction to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (Part 1 of 4)

Philosophical Studies. Much work in the philosophy of action in the last few decades has focused on the elucidation and justification of a series of purported norms of practical rationality that concern the presence or absence of intention in light of belief, and that demand a kind of structural coherence in the psychology of an agent. Examples of such norms all roughly formulated include: Intention Detachment, which proscribes intending to do something in case some condition obtains, believing that such condition obtains, and not intending to do that thing; Intention-Belief Consistency, which proscribes intending to do what you believe you will not do; Intention Consistency, which proscribes intending each of two ends you believe to be inconsistent; and Means-End Coherence, which proscribes intending an end and not intending the means you believe to be implied by your end. In this paper, I present a series of examples that show that these requirements are not genuine requirements of rationality. The reason for this is simple: these requirements concern the presence or absence of intention in light of all-out belief. Rational agents like us, however, do not, and in fact should not, always form or revise their intentions in light of what they all-out believe.




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